generally viewed by economists as reducing employee earnings nearly dollar for dollar, and thus largely borne by workers.)
There was also real resistance to cutting benefits. Social Security was already scheduled to replace a significantly smaller share of household pre-retirement earnings for retirement at any given age, due to the increase in the Full Retirement Age from 65 to 67 between 2000 and 2017.
Combined with projected increases in the taxation of benefits and in Medicare Part B premiums, which are deducted from Social Security checks, benefits are expected to replace less than 30 percent of the "average worker's" pre-retirement earnings by 2030, significantly less than the 40 percent of the mid-1990s. 3 The three Advisory Council proposals, which remain the primary options for introducing equities into the Social Security program, were to  Invest a portion of the Social Security Trust Fund assets in equities.
 Continue to invest Social Security Trust Fund assets in Treasuries and reduce benefits to
what the program could finance; but add mandatory contributions to an individual retirement savings account that could be invested in equities.
 Allow workers to divert a portion of their Social Security payroll tax to an individual account, which could be invested in equities, in exchange for a reduction in future Social Security benefits.
The Democrats under President Clinton had proposed adopting the first option -to invest a portion of the Social Security Trust Fund assets in stocks. 4 The Republicans under President Bush had proposed the third option -allowing workers to carve out a portion of their Social Security payroll tax to fund individual accounts where the funds could be invested in stocks.
5
And each side vehemently opposed the other's proposal. The Democrats viewed carve-out accounts as gutting, and potentially killing, the social insurance safety-net created by Franklin
Roosevelt. The Republicans viewed the government investing the Social Security Trust Fund in equities as crossing a critical red line in its involvement in the private economy. President Bush, in particular, made Social Security reform a major policy initiative. And he did so just as the railroad industry brought their proposal to Congress.
3 Munnell and Sass (2006) , p.12. The increased employment of married women, which raised a household's preretirement earnings far more than post-retirement benefits, further diminished Social Security's role in providing an income to the nation's elderly. Munnell, Sanzenbacher, and Soto (2007) . 4 Clinton (1999) . 5 See, for example, Greenspan (2001) .
The industry proposed that the Railroad Retirement Trust Fund invest in equities and other private securities -like a pension trust in a private employer defined benefit plan. The rub, however, was that Railroad Retirement was a government program and its assets were government assets. Investing the program's Trust Fund in equities was widely seen as creating a precedent for doing the same with Social Security. This was an unwanted complication for the industry as it generated stiff opposition that nearly scuttled the proposed reform -especially from Selling Treasuries and buying private securities would not be considered expenditure in "normal" accounting. The transaction would affect neither the income statement nor the balance sheet. But government accounting isn't "normal."
Government accounting is "cash" not "accrual" accounting. It does not distinguish between the purchase of "consumption" items that will be used within a year, such as copy paper or a welfare payment, and the purchase of "investment" items, such as a battleship with a 50 year life expectancy. Expenditures on copy paper and expenditures on battleships are both recorded as current expense. Normal "accrual" accounting, by contrast, would depreciate the cost of the battleship over its 50-year life expectancy and consider only a portion (say 1/50 th ) as a current expense. This is considered good practice as it records expense in time when good or service provides an economic contribution. But for a variety of reasons, among them the difficulty of determining the useful life of many government purchases, government accountants have adopted the simple cash accounting framework.
Consistent with cash accounting, OMB Circular A-11 instructs government accountants to "treat an investment in non-U.S. securities (equity or debt securities) as a purchase of an asset.
You must record an obligation and an outlay for the purchase in an amount equal to the purchase price." According to this procedure, the NRRIT's purchase of private securities would be booked as current government expenditure.
Nor would government accounting offset this "outlay" with the NRRIT's sale of Treasuries of equivalent value. OMB Circular A-11 instructs government agencies to treat
Treasuries as equivalent to cash, and the purchase or sale of Treasuries "as a change in the mix of asset holdings rather than as a purchase or sale of assets." Buying private securities is expenditure. Selling Treasuries is a non-event. Assuming the NRRIT would retain about 20 percent of its assets in Treasuries and use the proceeds from the sale of the remainder to purchase private securities, the CBO came up with its $15.3 billion expenditure figure. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: GOVERNING THE INVESTMENT PROCESS
The primary concern of Congress when it enacted the 2001 reform was the NRRIT and its ability to manage the investment of government assets efficiently and without political influence. This, not accounting, was the primary substantive issue motivating Republican resistance to the industry initiative. The Republicans were convinced that political pressures would inevitably affect how government assets were invested in private securities, which would undermine financial efficiency and -far more serious -the American democratic political system.
As addressed in the second discussion essay, Congress did what it could to make the investment of Railroad Retirement assets as much as possible a non-governmental activity. The 8 One Social Security accounting issue that the Railroad Retirement experience did not address is how to treat the return on equities in financial projections. Both the Social Security and Railroad Retirement actuaries, like other actuaries, use the expected return on equities in making such projections. Government budgetary officials, like many financial analysts, use the "risk-adjusted" return that "costs" the risk in equities as the difference between the expected return and the return on riskless government securities. After deducting this "cost," they use the much lower return on government securities in their financial projections. This is a very thorny and contentious issue, which the Railroad Retirement experience did nothing to resolve or clarify.
NRRIT was explicitly created as a non-governmental entity, with no government employees or agencies involved in its operations. The Trust was composed by statute in the image of a private multi-employer pension trust -with the Trustees primarily selected by management and labor, and the one "independent" trustee selected by these industry representatives. The Trust was charged, like a private pension trust, to make investment decisions solely in the interest of the plan participants. And it was instructed to use industry "best practice" to develop and execute a formal investment plan.
Consistent with the intent of Congress, the NRRIT has managed the assets of the Railroad Retirement program like a private pension trust, entirely free of political influence. But despite the fears of the Republicans, and hopes of the Democrats, the NRRIT experience does not provide much of a precedent for Social Security and the investment of Social Security Trust
Fund assets.
The primary impediment in using the NRRIT as a model for Social Security is the lack of national organizations that could legitimately select Trustees to oversee a Social Security Trust Despite these "lessons," the NRRIT experience offers little guidance on the crucial questions of who the Trustees would be that would invest Social Security assets in equitieshow they would be chosen, their powers, and the procedural guidelines they must follow in making investment decisions. The NRRIT "solution" -to have Trustees who "represent" the primary interested parties, chosen by organizations that could legitimately name representative Trustees, with powers and procedures modeled on private pension trusts -is simply not relevant.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: DEALING WITH RISK
The most important lessons for Social Security provided by the reformed Railroad Retirement Fund assets to annual benefit outlays. The ratchet was designed to keep Trust Fund assets within a target band of 4 to 6 times annual benefits. As shown in Figure 3 .1, the ratchet would automatically increase the payroll tax should the trailing ten-year average ratio fall below 4 times annual outlays; and cut taxes should the ratio rise above 6 times annual outlays. 9 In both cases, tax rates would rise or fall by an increasing amount as the trailing ten-year average ratio strayed beyond the target band of four-to-six times annual outlays. The ratchet was not designed to provide a complete solution to the problem of risk. The ratchet, a component of the reform package the industry negotiated and Congress enacted, could not push the payroll tax above 27 percent or below 8.2 percent of covered payroll. By basing the tax on the average ratio of Trust Fund assets to annual benefit outlays over the previous ten years, the design also dampened the tax response to sudden changes in the program's finances.
 The 8.2 percent floor on the payroll tax was an artifact of labor and management's agreement to split the "gains" of reform 50-50. So as the average account benefit ratio rose above 6 times annual outlays, the ratchet divided reductions in the payroll tax below 18 percent of covered payroll 50-50. The initial tax on workers was much lower than the initial tax on the carriers -4.9 vs. 13.1 percent of covered earnings. Once the average account benefit ratio exceeded 9 time annual outlays the ratchet eliminated the tax on workers. < 2.5 2.5 -3 3 -3.5 3.5 -4 4 -4.5 4.5 -5 5 -5.5 5.5 -6 6 -6.5 6.5 -7 7 -7.5 7.5 -8 8 -8.5 8.5 -9 > 9 Payroll tax Average account benefit ratio Total carrier tax worker tax reduction would only cut the tax on the carriers, violating the 50-50 understanding, there would be no further automatic reductions.
 The negotiators also agreed that carriers would bear the entire downside risk -that the carriers bear the full amount of any tax increase the ratchet imposed when the average account benefit ratio fell below 4 times annual outlays. The carriers, however, insisted on a cap -that the ratchet could not raise their tax above 22.1 percent of covered earnings. With the tax on workers capped at 4.9 percent, this limited the payroll tax funding the Railroad Retirement program to 27 percent of covered earnings.
 The railroad negotiators were eager to avoid large year-to-year swings in the payroll tax. So they had the ratchet set the payroll tax based on the relatively stable trailing ten-year average of the account benefit ratio. The Railroad Retirement Actuary, concerned that tax response to a downturn in the program's finances might be too slow, secured an increase in the tax rate increments. The top tax rate of 27 percent, agreed to by the carriers, is thus 50 percent higher than the baseline 18 percent rate; with the 22.1 percent top rate on the carriers nearly 70 percent higher than their baseline 13.1 percent rate. While taxes that high would dramatically improve the program's finances, the speed at which the ratchet can raise tax rates remains limited by its use of the trailing ten-year average ratio.
The Railroad Retirement ratchet can thus make very large adjustments to payroll tax rates, setting the rate anywhere from 8.2 to 27 percent of covered payroll. This extremely broad range is due to the expectation that the tax needed to maintain the account benefit ratio within the target band of four-to-six times outlays 1) would likely fall significantly over the course of the program's 75 year planning horizon; but 2) could also rise and fall quite dramatically over those 75 years. The ratchet nevertheless responded somewhat slowly to the very large financial shocks in 2008 and after.
Changes in Railroad Retirement finances that exceed the limits of the ratchet's automatic responses would require a political response. Should an 8.2 percent payroll tax produce an everrising account benefit ratio, Congress (and the industry) would need to decide how to redo the program. Congress (and the industry) would likewise need to decide what to do should a 27 percent payroll tax prove insufficient or should the ratchet respond too slowly to a sudden downturn in the program's finances. The critical measure of the ratchet's effectiveness in such cases is whether it gives the Congress (and the industry) enough time to fashion an adequate response.
The enactment of the 2001 Railroad Retirement reform suggests that Congress would require some type of automatic adjustment mechanism should it allow the Social Security Trust Fund to invest in equities. It also suggests that any such mechanism cannot be expected to provide a complete solution to the problem of risk. The design of the mechanism would specify the size and speed of the automatic adjustments, setting limits on its ability to stabilize Social Security's finances. A sufficiently large or long-lasting shock, which exceeds the mechanism's ability to respond, would require Congress to act. On the other hand, automatic adjustments large enough and fast enough to respond to such shocks could generate reactions so strong that Congress would also be required to act. The mechanism's design could only influence how and when Congress might intervene, not completely eliminate the need to intervene.
A Social Security program with a Trust Fund invested in equities should be far more stable and predictable than the current Railroad Retirement program. This is especially true for program's employment base, payroll tax revenues, number of beneficiaries, and annual benefit outlays. The ratio of Social Security beneficiaries to workers will rapidly rise as the Baby Boom generation ages, but then remain relatively stable. Nor will the Social Security Trust Fund likely be invested nearly as extensively in equities as the NRRIT. A Social Security program that invests in equities thus should not experience short-term shocks anywhere near as large, relative to the size of the program, as those seen in Railroad Retirement. The adjustment mechanism could thus be designed to respond rather slowly. The American political process, on the other hand, has convincingly demonstrated its inability to manage Social Security's finances. Despite knowing for decades that Social Security had a serious long-term financing shortfall, the nation for decades has failed to act.
10 This argues for allowing the automatic mechanism to make adjustments large enough to adequately address as many anticipated risks as possible -so Congress would only need to act should those adjustments generated substantial political resistance.
Several nations in recent years have introduced automatic adjustment mechanisms to make their social security programs more sustainable. The great majority, however, operate traditional pay-as-you-go programs with small Trust Funds designed to buffer short-term cash-flow 10 For some reasons why, see Diamond (1994) .
shortfalls, and hold only government bonds. They generally pay relatively high benefits, have relatively high tax rates, and anticipate revenue shortfalls in response to upcoming demographic shifts. Unlike the Railroad Retirement ratchet, nearly all of these automatic mechanisms only adjust benefits, not taxes -and are expected to adjust benefits downward. In one key respect the CPP mechanism is more suited to Social Security's needs than the Railroad Retirement ratchet. The CPP makes adjustments based on a long-term, forward-looking assessment of the program's finances; Railroad Retirement makes adjustments based on much shorter-term retrospective performance. As the finances of Social Security and the CPP are far more stable and predictable than those of the Railroad Retirement program, it is both feasible and preferable to adjust Social Security taxes and benefits based on long-term projections. 13 It might also be advisable to include a trigger based on a shorter-term assessment, given the experience of the sharp financial shocks since 2008, to respond to risks of near-term cash-flow shortfalls that 11 For a review see OECD (2012) . 12 The discussion of the Canada Pension Plan follows Monk and Sass (2009) . Sweden also invests social security trust fund assets in equities and investment performance is incorporated in program's automatic adjustment mechanism when setting benefits. Palacios (2002) . 13 This assumes that there is no Constitutional issue in changing tax rates based on actuarial projections provided by the executive branch of government, rather than an act of Congress.
the 75-year projection might not flag. But adjustments based on long-term projections would seem to be the norm, and any based on shorter-term assessments a safety measure.
The adjustments automatically made by the CPP, on the other hand, are decidedly not appropriate for Social Security. The burden of the CPP's tax and benefit adjustments by design falls most heavily on retirees. The three-year suspension of cost-of-living adjustments cuts the purchasing power of benefits 6 percent if inflation is running 2 percent a year, and 9 percent if inflation is running 3 percent a year. And these cuts are permanent -should cost-of-living adjustments resume, they resume from these post-freeze levels. The tax increases, by contrast, are unlikely to be anywhere near as large. And they could be reversed should conditions improve. Canada adopted these adjustments not because it viewed them as equitable, but as a political instrument: the threat of a benefit freeze is expected to mobilize retirees to "put a cannon" at the head of the politicians to get them to restore sustainability some other way. Given the U.S. track record in managing Social Security's finances, it seems advisable to adopt adjustments expected to be put in place, not to pressure politicians to act. One lesson Railroad Retirement offers, however, is how to respond to surpluses. The primary concern when reviewing automatic adjustment mechanisms is how they handle shortfalls -do they raise taxes, cut benefits, delay eligibility, make some other adjustment. But how do they handle surpluses? The Railroad Retirement ratchet lowers taxes. One could assume 14 As Monk and Sass write: "Concentrating the burden on current retirees is clearly at odds with general notions of social insurance objectives. The distribution of losses is also quite unfair: workers who will retire soon will pay the modestly higher contributions and then retire on unreduced benefits; workers just a few years older will have their CPP benefits substantially reduced. A small reduction in all benefits paid out over the next 76 years, a reduction akin to the increase in contributions, would be far more consistent with social insurance objectives." Monk and Sass (2009). that rail workers would spend that tax reduction on current consumption. For the carriers, the reduction would increase earnings, which would be used either to increase dividends or be retained and invested. To the extent that tax reductions on the carriers are retained and invested, the tax reduction increased the carriers' financial strength. Should the Railroad Retirement program subsequently face a financial shortfall, the carriers would be in a better position to pay the higher taxes the ratchet would introduce. Something similar could be done in Social Security -say by directing tax reductions on workers into individual accounts, which could be accessed only 1) to pay future payroll taxes, should taxes subsequently need to rise above the statutory rate; or 2) should the worker retire, become disabled, or die, or the value of the account exceed some specified amount.
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Finally, it is important to note that an automatic adjustment mechanism presupposes a program in balance, or moving toward balance. If Congress would require an automatic adjustment mechanism for the Social Security Trust Fund to invest in equities, the investment of Trust Fund assets in equities would need to be part of a package that produced a sustainable Social Security program. This would necessarily mean some combination of higher taxes, lower benefits, or delayed eligibility that would reduce the gap between tax revenues and benefit outlays, which income from the Trust Fund would need to fill, well below the currently projected shortfall of 25 to 30 percent scheduled benefits. A critical benefit of any reform package that included the investment of Trust Fund assets in equities would thus be the automatic adjustment mechanism. Though included in response to political demands for a mechanism to deal with risky equities, it would adjust the Social Security program in response to any shock, not just financial shocks. Had such a mechanism been in place, it could have introduced adjustments to Social Security, without the need for Congress to act, in response to the demographic shocks that have made current program unsustainable.
